Carlos Blanco's A Time to Talk, released on September 23

Chávez's Government

Last week, these lines addressed the topic of a possible government presided over by Henrique Capriles. This time, the analysis will deal with the hypothesis of an eventual Chávez's government, on the assumption that there will not be serious troubles in the upcoming election and the process will evolve peacefully.

If Chávez is elected, his health problem will be moved back to the front burner as a political variable. Chávez's campaign has clearly developed with severe physical limitations that do not reflect his energy of old times. Apart from how serious his illness may be and prognoses, Chávez's eventual new term would be marked by uncertainty about his health condition from the beginning. This fact, albeit just because of the laws of political physics, would intensify disputes for succession, rather secretly.

WHAT COULD BE ABOUT TO COME. Once reelected, Chávez would certainly try to go much farther in terms of institutional and social control. A means that many of his allies refer to is a new Constituent Assembly or a mechanism to amend the current Bolivarian Constitution. Although means have different scopes, it is well known that he is capable of doing whatever he wants without too many legal considerations. Once there, he could try to change requirements to appoint a vice president (to allow a president's relative to be appointed vice president, maybe?), eliminate the provision of holding election in the event of president's absolute absence during the first 4 years of the constitutional term; grant communes and community councils constitutional character as bases for the "people's power." Moreover, he would include militias in the Constitution and eliminate decentralization hierarchy in the Constitutional text, as well as other similar ideas that would grant him more power.

No doubt, Cuba's long and sticky hand would be involved in this transition. Since before, but above all, after presidential illness appeared, Fidel has insisted that "Chávez cannot do it all alone" and since last year, they have unsuccessfully tried to develop a succession mechanism for the Caudillo. However, in case of an eventual reelection, they will surely try it so that the regime does not go down the drain if Chávez is absent.

FIGHT FOR POWER. If Chávez has to leave his post due to his illness or starts to lose strength, the vice president would not have the same power. The center of gravity could be displaced to the National Assembly because Diosdado Cabello, the only "red" leader with his own military, financial, party and parliamentary power, but without mass leadership. Cabello's advantage is that no other leader has it and his power base would presumably allow him to impose on the pro-Cuba civil radical left. In case of Chávez's absence, the power that Chávez has concentrated on the Executive Office could be shared with the National Assembly.

THE ECONOMY. The economy is suffering from severe ailments: oil production is limited due to the lack of investment; public debt has grown at an unprecedented pace; inflation has skyrocketed and its cousin, scarcity, is getting up to its old tricks; exchange rate is unsustainable; wages are not enough or cannot be increased to compensate for bolivar's deterioration; the administration is increasingly inefficient; and social demands have multiplied due to official failures and because the Democratic Opposition has exposed them to the public.

Faced with this panorama, a government of Chávez would have to adopt measures that, as experience has shown, would be camouflaged for them not to look like a "package" and will be accompanied with spectacular political actions. It should not be doubted that the Caudillo could even sacrifice a sector of his own administration, perhaps the one that has been described as most corrupt, to implement "a new style" and leave behind any dead weight additional to the one he himself already carries. For a time, he would try to maintain a democratic face, violent, yes, but democratic, which he has gained thanks to lots of money, tolerance, and international shamelessness.

Since it is already difficult for him to convince Venezuelans that, after 14 years, AD and Copei are to blame for the people's current evils, he could possibly resort even more intensely to the Capitalism vs. Socialism dilemma. This way, it would be possible to blame the "enduring vestiges of Capitalism" for the current evils and the establishment of an imaginary communal society would be provided with an ideological cover.

BOTH ARMS. The main social control instruments would be community councils and militias, controlled from Miraflores (presidential palace). For authoritarian purposes, it is not necessary to erase formally governor and mayor posts or the armed forces. Attempts would be made to displace power toward party-controlled social and armed entities, which, in the Leninist conception filtered through the Cuban sieve, become instruments for the attainment of the ultimate goals of the so-called Revolution.

COULD CHAVEZ DEAL WITH CHÁVEZ'S INHERITANCE? A random Chávez's administration would have to harvest the disaster constructed by Chávez himself to perpetuate in power. His inheritance consists of badly built homes; exponential increase in urban disaster; totally disorganized private economy; lack of domestic and foreign private investment; high rate of informal jobs hardly covered with the mantle of the Bolivarian social missions and other kinds of generosity; wholesale assassinations and kidnappings, a country shrunk due to narco-guerrillas and international cleverness; groups fighting for power from Miraflores to the last tiny piece of red territory; and social demands that are no longer stopped with the promise of the Cuban Paradise in Venezuela. An eventual new term would not be fully exercised and the catastrophe that according to Chávez could be avoided with his election would only be accelerated. Chávez III would be harassed for the things that Chávez I and Chávez II have not done or have done badly, very badly.

Either because Chávez cannot do it or because he decides to take care of his health, we should not lose sight of the Cuban scheme. Fidel is there, like a guardian that stops dramatic changes from happening, while Raúl governs waiting for his dearest brother to finally get on the caldron that the Angel of Evil has reserved for his peers. Assuming that Chávez wins reelection, would he possibly hand over his post and open up the way for an unknown name that would be cooking in the Cuban oven? If Chávez wins, he would be a diminished man and the change he would have avoided in 2012 ends up happening in 2013. An exhaust government does not have political resources to perpetuate itself.

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Translated by Álix Hernández