Carlos Blanco's A Time To Talk released on June 24

And what if they don't want to?

As you know, there are people in the regime that stubbornly refuse to hand over power, including those that follow the venerable Fidel's advice, according to which, revolutions only hold elections that they will surely win, as the good-for-nothing Daniel Ortega said on the occasion of the presidential election in which he defeated Violeta Chamorro. Later, the then soon-to-be elderly man repeated the same words in Venezuela. The logic is simple: a revolution cannot surrender to the ups and downs of the masses that are influenced by bourgeois and imperialist parties. The Stalin that every chavista leader has in their soul determines that there are only two kinds of human beings: those on my side and the CIA agents, either aware of it or not; therefore, how can you imagine that the revolution is going to surrender to the cloudy minds and awful hands of the enemy!

The methods to oppose the people's will are varied. In Pérez Jiménez' times, when the opposition won the elections in 1952, the military commands simply decided not to recognize the results and place the colonel on the presidential chair and that's it. But now, you cannot do that. Now, you have to win the election or, at least, make it look as if you won it. 

The scenario of a National Electoral Council (CNE) openly certifying that Henrique Capriles won the election and later chavista leaders rising up with a group of military and armed civilians is not real. If the CNE says that Chávez lost, the same that happened with Pinochet in 1988 referendum will happen. At that time, it was late when he wanted to rise up, because several military leaders already knew that he had lost and told it to the press before they met the Chilean Commander in Chief.

Without the real possibility of the CNE saying one thing and Chávez and his group trying to deny it, it is obvious that the regime's strategy is aimed at preventing the CNE from telling something different, but that Chávez won. Therefore, the opposition has the duty to solve two problems instead of one: getting the votes and preventing them from disappearing through hidden ways, not being counted or for them to be summed to the caudillo thanks to a virtual hand.

ON RECOGNIZING THE RESULTS. Having said that rising up against a result issued by the CNE is not viable, the government's aim is not to leave any doubt about what the result will be. It is worth noting that the desire of the regime is not unavoidable, but is good to be alert.

Chávez repeatedly demands the opposition to express their will to obey the election results and the opposition, lazy, will not say it clearly. Why? It's clear like water: the opposition is being asked to accept the President's victory, which would eventually occur given the advantages, the rigged and manipulated voter roll, gerrymandering of electoral districts, the creation of polling centers hardly accessible to opposition voters, and other little details. In a nutshell, the government is telling the opposition to accept beforehand the results of an election that is surrounded by advantages and fraud. To the best of my recollection, only Ramón G. Aveledo has said that if Chávez wants that commitment, he has to commit to stop unprecedented and abusive advantages and manipulation. No official response has been given yet.

If the opposition, led by its candidate, firmly upholds the idea that it will recognize any election result, provided elections are free and transparent, Capriles could make a high, historically majestic and definite bet. That would be like saying: I recognize the result if you win a transparent election, but I will not recognize it if elections are rigged.

Most polls say that Chávez is winning, but surprisingly, there are a number of undecided people that could account for one third of the total number of voters. Without hoping to turn polls into the oracles they have been expected to be, something is true: polarization gives rise to radical opposite sides, but there are also voters that out of fear, boredom, prudence or any other reason, will not reveal their preferences. There Capriles would have broad possibilities to capture a majority share of undecided people so as to win. That is, his victory is possible, albeit not unavoidable.

THE GOVERNMENT'S ESSENTIAL TOPIC IS CNE. If Chávez wins through votes, within a framework of radical advantageous position being accepted by the opposition, non credible complaint would be possible on October 7. Within a different context, if he wins through fraudulent votes, advantageous position, the abusive use of the State's resources, including the state-run communicational apparatus, and with a rigged electoral system, the only way to face a false victory is by reporting from this very moment on the fraud that is on the making. It would not be about reporting this or that irregularity something the opposition is increasingly doing- but reporting that those irregularities are a part of a plan to illegally prevent the possible opposition victory, which would provide Capriles with the political and moral authority to denounce the entire process and request an active people's support.

By the way, a remark is worth at this point. The idea of being quiet because elections are to be won, but calling people to protest on 10/7 if elections are stolen, is completely unreal. A society to which a victory has been assured, cannot be called one day to face a fraud; most likely, it will not go out; but if it does under those improvised conditions- the same that have stolen the election will have no doubt to resort to everything to repress; a responsible leadership will not expose the society to that risk.

The other option is for Capriles to win and that amid the skullduggery inside the CNE, somebody tries data to be changed as it happened in Pérez Jiménez' plebiscite in December 1957. In this case, the opposition, as well as the institutional military officers and the organized forces, would already have all the information and the same situation as in 2007 Constitutional Referendum could occur, when Chávez' regime was stopped by the combination of a determined and planned stance of parties at the CNE, the student movement and the military, encouraged General Baduel, who had been their leader until a short time ago.

CONCLUSION. The only way for the opposition to have the true possibility of a victory is by means of a political denunciation of the government's plan, which not only consists of not recognizing an election result favorable to Capriles, but preventing, through the CNE, the Voter Roll, the polling booths, intimidation by members of the Plan República, paramilitary groups, sites for "chavista areas," an effective vote, mostly for Capriles, from being materialized.

Twitter @carlosblancog

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Translated by Álix Hernández