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CARACAS, Saturday December 31, 2011 | Update
 
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The year in review

A look back at 2011

An unheralded murder rate and a record-breaking number of protests, in addition to prolonged food shortages, round up a year in which President Chávez faced a new, unforeseeable foe

Never before had Hugo Chávez been publicly seen under such light: from Havana, Cuba, he spoke to Venezuelans and confirmed his cancer diagnosis, which he now claims to have overcome in less than six months. This was also the year when the government was forced to acknowledge the nation’s soaring murder rate. Also, civil protests broke all records. Shortages of milk and other basic food products drag on. And accusations about irregularities related to the Chinese Fund seem to be just the tip of the iceberg (File photos)
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EL UNIVERSAL
Saturday December 31, 2011  12:00 AM


One scandal after another, accusation after accusation, drama, surprise, compromises, tragedy. Venezuela has become a country of constant upheaval, and the year about to end was filled with suspense. The following list is not comprehensive; it is merely a digest of some of the issues likely to be on the 2012 agenda.

An illness

At roughly 9 p.m. on July 30th, it was none other than Hugo Chávez himself who confirmed what had turned into an uncontrollable rumor. In a nationwide radio and television address, but broadcasted from Havana unlike most, he seemed beside himself: troubled, paused, thin and distressed, as he read a brief speech in which he acknowledged that doctors had found "the presence of an abscessed tumor with cancerous cells" in his body.

Too many days had passed since he had last spoken publicly; far too long, that is, when it comes to Chávez. The president had reached Cuba on June 8; it was the final stop on a tour that had included Brazil and Ecuador. It was just another work visit in which he would "review" with Cuban President Raúl Castro some of the most important bilateral agreements on issues such as refineries and telecommunications, as well as the creation of a military academy based on "Latin American doctrine."

On June 10, an official statement informed that Chávez had undergone surgery to remove a "pelvic abscess" and was expected to return to Venezuela soon. From Havana, he passed the Indebtedness Law and ordered his team to expedite "all missions and related things." Discussion on the legality of his absence and the fact that he enacted decrees from abroad arose.

As June came to an end, the rumors about his cancer grew stronger, further fueled by Miami Spanish-language newspaper El Nuevo Herald's report that Chávez was in "critical" condition. Government spokespersons, like National Assembly President Fernando Soto Rojas, denied those claims. "I would be the first to tell the country otherwise. Chávez is healing and will return, God willing, on July 5th," Soto Rojas stated as masses and indigenous rituals were held for the sake of the president's health. Truth to be told, neither Soto nor a large portion of the government team knew the truth about Chávez's health.

Alongside rumors and "classified information," speculations abounded regarding a possible "succession" as if it were a monarchical issue. The names of political strongmen, Nicolás Maduro and Elías Jaua, were repeatedly brought up. Even Diosdado Cabello and Adán Chávez were mentioned.

Then, on July 30th, the Head of State was back and made an announcement in his peculiar manner. He said that, after the surgery to remove the abscess, he was told by Fidel Castro about "other previously undetected cell formations." He explained that a second visit to the O.R. was required for "full extraction of the tumor."

From that moment on, "analyses" on the president's illness flooded the news waves for the remainder of the year, combining political estimates and allegedly well-supported medical assumptions. Chávez made a surprise return to the country on the dawn of the 4th of July and made a speech from the Miraflores Palace on that very same day to show his followers that he was in full recovery mode. But, even now, the truth about his condition has not been disclosed, and speculation at national and foreign levels is commonplace.

In 2011 Chávez had to face a new, unpredictable foe —cancer— which he claims to be defeating to set his sights on the upcoming electoral race.

Protests galore

Even if totals for 2011 cannot be consolidated yet, this has been the year with the most civil protests in Hugo Chávez's long tenure. In its chapter on the right to peaceful protests, the report issued by NGO Provea, spanning from October 2010 to September 2011, indicated that 4,543 protests were held during this period (compared with 3,315 over the previous term).

The report establishes that "this figure has increased for the fifth consecutive time," and that "the population's discontent with the government stems from the lack of comprehensive public policies focusing on human rights and the proposed inclusion in constitutional law of bans on peaceful protests."

Though Provea's report recorded a fall in the number of protests suppressed (134), it warns about the official strategy to criminalize protests, which would essentially lead to protestors being prosecuted as common criminals. "The Venezuelan human rights movement has denounced before national and international authorities that there are over 2,500 persons in the country subject to those criminal policies."

Employees top the list when it comes to frequency of protests at 1,995 (44%). Neighbors follow with 1,614, and students place third with 402 protests. In addition, protests recorded in October by the Venezuelan Social Conflict Watch amounted to 489: 193 for labor conflicts; 155 demanding homes; 117 regarding crime, rights of convicted individuals, political participation and seeking justice. The remaining 24 protests related to education issues.

October also consolidates workers as "the social actor with most conflicts for the tenth consecutive month." The Watch recorded 149 hunger strikes throughout 10 months, mainly by inmates and their families.

Murder by numbers

2011 will be remembered as the year in which the government finally published murder rates. On February 7, before the National Assembly, the minister of Internal Affairs, Tareck El Aissami, defended the "achievements" of the revolution in lowering crime, but had to acknowledge a most troubling aspect: "The murder rate in Venezuela is 48 homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants, and it is still higher than the average for Latin America; that is the truth."

This figure corresponds to 2010; however, a survey conducted by INE and published by newspaper EL NACIONAL pointed at a rate of 75 murders per 100 thousand inhabitants for the period from July 2008 to July 2009.

Nevertheless, the statements by the minister allowed researchers from the Venezuelan Violence Watch to determine that he had "acknowledged" that 13 thousand 890 murders took place in 2010.

The figure determined by the Watch itself is 17 thousand 600 hundred. Estimates indicate that by the end of 2011 approximately 19 thousand Venezuelans will have been murdered, not including deaths involving police shootouts. This represents a rate of 60 murders per 100 inhabitants. But, according to Roberto Briceño León, that is a "conservative" estimate.

According to police statistics, published by EL UNIVERSAL, from January to November 30, 15,360 people were murdered throughout the country. In Caracas alone, 2,900 homicides by firearm took place.

This means that as of November, and no changes are expected in December, Caracas has a murder rate of 58 homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants, and in Venezuela as a whole there were 53 murders per 100 thousand inhabitants. And these statistics do not include 487 inmates murdered as of October in prisons around the country.

Vanishing act

It is not the first time that milk disappears from retailers' shelves in this country. However, 2011 has been one of the worst years in this sense. The president of the National Livestock Farming Federation, Manuel Cipriano Heredia, listed some of the factors behind the shortage of milk: prolonged failure to break even, price controls—though for powdered milk "the government approved a 31.8% increase for consumers but not for producers"—and the fact that only the state is allowed to import the product and, according to Heredia, "only 20% of those imports make it to the private sector."

The minister of Agriculture and Land, Juan Carlos Loyo, begs to differ. His statements seem to indicate that the problem does not lie in price controls; it is due to speculation. Also, Loyo blames shortages on the way Venezuelans actually consume milk: "We do not consume most of the liquid milk produced in the country, which undergoes a pasteurization process, because powdered milk, which requires a different agricultural and industrial process, is preferred (...) limiting the use of fresh milk and creating the need to import."

He also points his finger at the media and increased purchasing power: "There is certain manipulation of consumption. More products are acquired as a result of purported shortages. Consumption is induced, and people purchase the product hastily over two or three days. Because the purchasing power has recovered, people can buy more food."

A recent survey by Datanálisis (November-December) reported milk shortages at 79.8%. And, as of the end of November, the government had seized 260 thousand kilograms of powered milk that was allegedly being hoarded.

China bound

On November 23, national oil company Pdvsa approved two new credit facilities with China for USD 6 billion. Also, the state renewed the USD 4-billion Heavy Fund, a credit through which Pdvsa undertakes to send 410 thousand petroleum barrels per day to China.

Loans with China amount to USD 32 billion through "financial architecture" comprising Heavy Funds I and II, as well as the Large-Volume Long-Term Fund, which are mainly paid in petroleum.

These transactions have been under great scrutiny but, in November, National Assembly Member Miguel Angel Rodríguez produced internal documents evidencing that Pdvsa is under no capacity to undertake such level of debt—the government's intention would be to raise it by yet another USD 116 billion—and denounced that this transaction conceals a mechanism allowing President Chávez to use oil resources through a parallel budget not subject to formal oversight.

Translated by Félix Rojas Alva

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