How will people in 2018 look back on this year? It depends on what we do
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I. Looking Back -To See Ahead
How will people in 2018 look back on this year?
It depends on what we do.
September was a hard month in a precarious year. A
meltdown in financial, credit, and housing markets.
The continuing stress of high food and fuel prices.
Anxieties about the global economy.
Over the past year, most developing economies grew robustly
despite the turmoil. In fact, major developing countries
powered an alternative engine of growth. In 2007, they
averaged a record 7.9 percent in GDP growth and in 2008 perhaps
a still impressive 6.6 percent.
But this is not shared by all. Soaring food and fuel
prices are plunging the most vulnerable into a danger zone.
People are hurting. Families are worried about what
coming days will bring.
The events of September could be a tipping point for many
developing countries. A drop in exports, as well as
capital inflow, will trigger a falloff in investments.
Deceleration of growth and deteriorating financing conditions,
combined with monetary tightening, will trigger business failures
and possibly banking emergencies. Some countries will
slip toward balance of payments crises. As is always
the case, the most poor are the most defenseless.
While American eyes are on the intersection of Wall and Main
Streets, there is much more to the story. The response
to these crises will have to be larger and global.
Voices around the world are blaming free markets. Others
are asking about the failures of government institutions.
Many will point fingers at the failings of the United States,
as the architect of today's global economy.
We cannot turn back the clock on globalization. Nor
can we let the crisis of today blind us to the opportunity
of tomorrow.
We must learn the lessons from the past, as we build for
the future. We must Modernize Multilateralism and Markets
for a changing World Economy.
Ours must be globalization where both the opportunities and
the responsibilities are more widely shared. Without
that, we may design a new architecture but it will be a house
of cards.
Multilateralism, at its best, is a means for solving problems
among countries, with the group at the table willing and able
to take constructive action together.
I am a mechanic in multilateralism. For over 20 years,
I have been involved in trying to make the international system
work. Next week, at the Bank-IMF Annual Meetings, I
will turn to the implications of the last twelve months for
the World Bank Group. But today, with a crisis in progress
and an election within weeks, I will sketch a larger drawing.
II. Transformation in the Global Political Economy
To understand today's crisis, we need to consider what has
happened over at least the last 20 years.
Today's globalization and markets reflect huge changes in
information and communications technology, financial and trade
flows, mobility of labor, worldwide interconnectivity - "the
death of distance," and vast new competitive forces.
But even those transformations do not capture the biggest
change: Over the past 25 years, the world market economy has
grown from about 1 billion to 4 or 5 billion people.
The world's labor force engaged in export markets has grown
to over 800 million. These are amazing increases in
a relatively short period.
The competition of globalization, the huge expansion of the
global labor force, and relatively low commodity prices combined
to create something else: a Golden Era for the central bankers.
The price dampening effects of these shifts made central bankers
look like technocratic wizards - and we liked their magic.
Loose monetary policies and abundant liquidity led investors
to "chase yield" - and one another. Investors lent and
leveraged against seemingly ever-rising asset values, without
attention to credit risk, earning power, and cash flows.
Investors did not plan to hold the assets long enough to wait
for earnings. Even when they did, the investor share
was "guaranteed" by assurances "backed by" those same high
asset prices.
With the burst of the internet bubble and Japan's long real
estate and banking crisis, the liquidity deluge spilled over
to developing countries, especially those whose currencies
were pegged to the dollar. Commodity prices fell with
the collapse of the Soviet Union, leading to under investment,
especially in oil and metals, and then rose dramatically as
developing economies hungered for inputs. Fuel and food
became increasingly linked, both because the share of energy
used in food production and transport increased, and consumers
of food and energy have become competitors: A food for oil
crisis in the making. And this year we saw it erupt.
The higher prices could push some 100 million people in developing
countries back into poverty. We risk a second round
of inflation, balance of payments crises, and tight budgets.
The sources of international capital pools have been shifting,
too. The commodities boom, especially for energy, led
to huge returns, ending up in sovereign wealth funds.
Burnt by the trauma of 1997-98, some developing countries
resolved never to risk that anguish again and managed exchange
rates to create immense reserves. These savings seeded
other sovereign funds.
Changes in labor forces, financial liquidity, commodity markets,
and sovereign funds reflect an even more significant transformation:
New economic powers are on the rise.
The engagement of rising powers with the global economy has
made them "stakeholders" in the global system. China
is now the world's third largest trading entity. As
the middle class grows in Asia, these savers will become important
investors in corporate equities in developed countries, further
strengthening global links.
These rising powers want to be heard. They want to
know what will be their role in making the new rules for the
global economy. Having demonstrated their competitive
success, these rising powers are suspicious that the more
established stakeholders will hold them back, whether through
old rules of trade and finance, or new rules for climate change
and the environment.
The developed economy "stakeholders," in turn, both benefit
from - and are threatened by - the changes. Rising developing
economies offer multiple poles of growth that assist their
recoveries and offer new possibilities, but they also serve
as fodder for scaremongers. Indeed, with growth rates
averaging about 6.6 percent between 1997 and 2007, some 25
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, with almost two-thirds of
the region's population, offer a vision of yet another pole
of growth that might be developed over the coming decades.
This could be a great achievement, not only for overcoming
poverty and for development, but also freeing untapped talents
and energies.
But it will be an achievement left unrealized unless we have
the vision and the courage to stand up to the challenges of
economic isolationism at home, and to offer the leadership
to help make it happen. The financial and economic pains
and fears will reinforce a tendency to pull back. Some
feel that the rules of the game - dealing with bailouts, exchange
rates, trade, immigration, and foreign aid - leave them out,
even if people with higher incomes seem to be able to take
advantage of the changes. Many worry that the old "safety
nets" to help people adjust to change are woefully out of
date. This agenda - not just the aftermath of financial
rescues - must be seized by new leaders.
III. Storm Clouds Over Multilateralism and Markets
The events of this year are a wake up call.
There are storm clouds over multilateralism and markets.
As food prices soared, agricultural markets started to break
down under political pressures. Some 40 countries imposed
bans or restrictions on exports of food. Others imposed
price controls, broke contracts, and halted trading.
The UN strained mightily to get countries to double their
contributions to food assistance for those most in need.
Poor nations struggled to get seeds and fertilizers to farmers.
They tried to patch together "safety nets" for the most vulnerable.
Poverty, hunger, and malnutrition increased.
As the global system for agriculture ran aground, the World
Trade Organization drifted into dangerous waters. The
Doha Round has hit the rocks.
The Climate Change negotiations organized under the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change will be made more difficult by
the WTO's discord, which will exacerbate the tensions between
developed and developing economies. Under the best of
circumstances, this negotiation will be an uphill struggle.
Furthermore, the "cap-and-trade" climate change bill that
failed in the U.S. Senate this year points to the next challenge
for multilateralism and markets. To avoid putting industries
subject to carbon caps at a competitive disadvantage, the
bill invoked trade protections against exporters that did
not face carbon limits.
While needs are growing, the international aid system is
not keeping pace.
Donors bring ideas, energy, and resources, but they also
can overwhelm national ownership by developing countries,
harming the effectiveness of aid. In 2006, there were
more than 70,000 aid transactions with an average project
size of only $1.7 million. Last year, the average developing
country hosted 260 donor visits. Vietnam had 752.
National governments are drawn increasingly to provide aid
with their flag, not through multilateralism that encourages
coherence and building local ownership. Even so, the
G-7 as a whole is far behind its Gleneagles' commitments to
boost development assistance.
Private financial markets and businesses will continue to
be the strongest drivers of global growth and development.
But the developed world's financial systems, especially in
the United States, have revealed glaring weaknesses after
suffering titanic losses.
The international architecture designed to deal with such
circumstances is creaking.
Perhaps the most striking change since my experience in the
U.S. Treasury in the 1980s is the loss of fortunes of the
G-7. This group once played a valuable role coordinating
policy, with agreements such as the Plaza and the Louvre Accords.
But the Economic Summits long ago placed a priority on ceremony
over policy. I still harbor hope that the meetings of
Finance Ministers will offer a multilateral navigator in dealing
with global financial and economic problems. But the
forum falls far short of the need.
IV. A New Multilateral Network for a New Global
Economy
Even as the United States and the world dig out of the present
hole, we need to look further ahead: We will need a
New Multilateral Network for a New Global Economy.
The Bretton Woods generation left two legacies: first, international
institutions and regimes - in various states of service and
repair. Second, and more important, that generation
left an intellectual, policy, and political commitment to
act multilaterally to turn the problems of an era into opportunities.
Some are calling for a 21st Century approach, but many are
falling back to mid-20th Century models.
The New Multilateralism, suiting our times, will need to
be a flexible network, not a fixed nor unitary system.
It needs to maximize the strengths of interconnecting and
overlapping actors and institutions, public and private.
We have seen that the more adaptable national economies handle
the inevitable shocks and changes most effectively; applying
that experience, the multilateral system needs to build in
flexibility. It also needs to use markets and incentives
for private sector organizations and individuals, profit-making
and civil society NGOs.
The New Multilateralism should be respectful of state sovereignty,
while at the same time recognizing that many issues do not
respect state borders.
This New Multilateral Network needs to be pragmatic.
Its baseline work is to foster cooperation by encouraging
exchanges of perspectives on interests, both domestic and
international. Often just sharing information is a start.
Then we should encourage a search for mutual interests.
Sometimes mutual interests can be fostered with incentives
- and international institutions can become catalysts for
action. Practical problem-solving builds a culture of
cooperation.
Our New Multilateralism must build toward a sense of shared
responsibility for the health of the global political economy.
This means - chiefly and critically - that it must involve
those with a major stake in that economy, those willing to
share in the responsibilities along with the benefits of maintaining
it.
We must redefine economic multilateralism beyond the traditional
focus on finance and trade. The changing world economy
demands that we think more broadly. Today, energy, climate
change, and stabilizing fragile and post-conflict states are
economic issues. They are already part of the international
security and environmental dialogue. They must be the
concern of economic multilateralism as well.
V. Priorities
A New Steering Group
The New Multilateralism will still depend principally on
national leadership and cooperation. Countries matter.
The G-7 is not working. We need a better group for
a different time.
The G-20, though valuable, is too unwieldy in moving from
discussion to action.
We need a core group of Finance Ministers who will assume
responsibility for anticipating issues, sharing information
and insights, exploring mutual interests, mobilizing efforts
to solve problems, and at least managing differences.
For financial and economic cooperation, we should consider
a new Steering Group including Brazil, China, India, Mexico,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and the current G-7.
Such a Steering Group would bring together over 70 percent
of the world's GDP, 56 percent of world population, 62 percent
of its energy production, the major carbon emitters, the principal
development donors, large regional actors, and the primary
players in global capital, commodity, and exchange rate markets.
But this Steering Group would not be a G-14. We will
not create a new world simply by remaking the old. It
should be numberless, flexible, and over time, it could evolve.
Others may be added, especially if their rising influence
is matched by a willingness to help shoulder responsibilities.
This new Steering Group should meet and videoconference regularly
to foster group responsibility. The Deputies should
have frequent and informal discussions. An active network
of bilateral consultations within and beyond the group will
support it. We need a Facebook for multilateral economic
diplomacy.
The IMF and World Bank Group, perhaps with the WTO, can help
support this Steering Group. We can identify emerging
problems, supply analysis, suggest solutions, and draw on
our own broader membership to propose coalitions to address
issues.
The Steering Group members will still need to work through
established international institutions and regimes, which
include other states. Sovereignties will be respected.
But the core group would increase the likelihood that countries
draw together to address problems that are larger than any
one state.
We need this mechanism so that countries are not left to
fail - with all the human, economic, and political consequences
this entails for both them and their neighbors. We need
it so that global problems are not just mopped up after the
fact, but anticipated. We need it to develop the habit
of dialogue and the necessary relationships of trust before
the crisis hits. We need it to shape multilateral solutions.
International Finance and Development
We have seen the dark side of global connectedness.
We need to navigate toward the light.
The first task will be close to home. Next year, there
will be a major effort in the United States to overhaul the
failed system of financial regulation and supervision.
There will need to be improvements in clearing and settlement.
Rules on transparency, capital, leverage, accounting, and
increasingly important, liquidity, must be modernized.
We must ask why so many thoroughly regulated and supervised
institutions got into trouble. Any risk-based model,
no matter how sophisticated and well supervised, depends critically
on the assumptions. What happens when the assumptions
fail?
The changing conditions that trigger failure will increasingly
be dependent on shifts in the world economy. Just as
the crisis has been international because of interconnectedness,
the reforms will need to be multilateral.
The Financial Stability Forum (FSF), ably chaired by Mario
Draghi of the Bank of Italy, has started to tackle these issues.
But the FSF concentrates on the OECD countries. Whether
through an expanded FSF, a stronger FSF-IMF linkage, or the
Steering Group, these financial supervisory issues will need
to be addressed in a broader multilateral context.
We must bolster an IMF early warning system for the global
economy, focused on crisis prevention and not just crisis
resolution.
September's financial shock waves in the United States are
reverberating in the global economy. The stark reality
is that developing countries must prepare for a drop in trade,
capital flows, remittances, and domestic investment, as well
as slowdown in growth.
Countries with sound fiscal and balance of payments positions
should be encouraged to spur domestic demand through consumption
and investment. But others have little fiscal space,
risky current account deficits, balance of payments problems,
financial danger, or all four. The Fund and the Development
Banks will need to assist. For some larger countries
under threat, the Steering Group and friendly countries should
act in concert with the Fund and the Banks to offer support
linked to policy reforms that will return the country to sustainable
growth.
The IMF must also have an ongoing role in the world's exchange
rates system, beyond surveillance. As Jean Pisani-Ferry
wrote recently, a large part of the developing world is not
yet ready for independent floating of their currencies, because
of incomplete financial liberalization and anxieties about
uncontrolled adjustment. The IMF, backed by the Steering
Group, can offer more options, including pegs linked to currency
baskets or commodities. Over time, we need to prepare
for an international finance system with multiple reserve
currencies, with others connected by various pegs.
The New Multilateralism must put global development on a
par with international finance. Until we build a more
inclusive globalization, the world will remain unstable, no
matter how big the financial rescue packages.
Economic multipolarity offers stability and opportunity,
just like a diversified portfolio of investments. But
to boost more inclusive and sustainable growth, we need to
think about aid differently.
Two weeks ago at the United Nations, international partners
raised USD 16 billion for development projects. This
money is vital, and we need more if we are to meet the Millennium
Development Goals.
But we also must broaden our approach. We must listen
to the growing number of Africans who are telling us they
want markets and opportunities, not aid dependency.
Private capital and markets will remain the drivers of growth.
We must look beyond projects and programs to new ways of doing
the business of development. We need innovative instruments
and intermediation to: help connect Sovereign Wealth Funds
to equity investments in Africa; build local currency bond
markets in emerging markets; manage development risks through
insurance facilities for weather and catastrophic events,
and to help small farmers; demonstrate the viability of public-private
financing partnerships to develop infrastructure; and broaden
types of assistance, from advance commitments to develop life-saving
pharmaceuticals to debt or rate buydowns.
While we build markets and institutions for the medium and
longer term, the New Multilateralism needs mechanisms to move
much more quickly and effectively to help those who are most
vulnerable when crisis hits. One example is the World
Bank's new USD1.2 billion rapid financing facility for those
endangered by high food prices.
Another example could be the reform of humanitarian food
assistance. With a modest modernization of donor support
to the World Food Program - such as core or multi-year funding
and a credit line - we could apply financial market tools
to help the WFP manage liquidity, market, and operational
risks. Working with the World Meteorological Organization,
the WFP and the Bank could better prepare, cut costs, and
respond more quickly. We also need a worldwide agreement
not to apply food export bans or prohibitive taxes to humanitarian
purchases, as well as an agreement to release national reserve
stocks should an excessive price increase occur due to hoarding
or speculation. These risk management tools are the
21st Century equivalent to building big food stocks for security
in eras past. But we need political leadership to break
through old bureaucratic models.
The World Bank Group must also adapt more quickly to meet
new needs of its clients and interests of its shareholders.
We need to better align our governance with the realities
of the 21st Century. To look beyond our initial steps
for changing voice, representation, and responsibility, I
will assemble a High Level Commission to consider the modernization
of World Bank Group governance - so we can operate more dynamically,
effectively, efficiently, and legitimately in a transformed
global political economy. I am delighted that Ernesto
Zedillo has agreed to lead this work. I have asked Ernesto
to work with colleagues looking at governance issues at the
IMF.
In 1944, at Bretton Woods, the Founding Fathers of economic
multilateralism seized a moment to build a better future.
We must be no less ambitious today.
The WTO and the Global Trading System
The Doha global trade negotiations in the WTO are gasping
on life support. It is vital that the WTO and an open
global trading system not be buried with them.
Trade negotiations will continue elsewhere. Recent
research has shown how FTA negotiations can support broader
opening of markets. But FTAs and preferential arrangements
that are not broad-based could weaken global liberalization.
They need to be linked to global disciplines. And the
multilateral system remains the only option for lifting the
heavy hand of trade-distorting support for agriculture, still
running at some $260 billion per year.
Litigation in the WTO creates winners and losers. If
not balanced with win-win negotiations, a WTO associated only
with litigation will likely lose support. WTO members
will need to consider how to continue to foster global liberalization.
One option is to shift trade facilitation from a negotiation
to a development plan. There are opportunities to cut
costs of trade far in excess of those imposed by tariffs and
other trade barriers. The World Bank's "Doing Business"
trading and "Logistics" indicators offer the diagnostic groundwork.
Regional bodies such as APEC have pointed the way in practice.
We can help countries simplify and harmonize procedures and
documentation across a supply chain. Countries can apply
risk management techniques in border inspection and customs
clearing, backed by electronic processing. And we can
strengthen capacity, technology, and the availability of trade
finance.
The original multilateral logic behind the GATT negotiations,
which led to the WTO, was the "bargaining tariff." Even
though it should be in a country's economic interest to lower
tariffs and cut costs, political interests required "trading
off" barriers that were defended by protected groups.
A new trade facilitation and development agenda puts the
self-interest of lowering costs of trading to work for a multilateral
interest of encouraging more integration, efficiencies, and
opportunities - meaning, more jobs, more growth, less poverty.
As the exporters and importers do more business, they may
be able to increase their voice for liberalizing negotiations,
too.
This is multilateralism by practical steps, moving ahead
where it is possible to do so.
Energy and Climate Change
The New Multilateral Network must also interconnect energy
and climate change.
World energy markets are a mess. Producers, fearful
of collapsing prices, are wary of new investments. Consuming
countries want lower prices for consumers, but prices high
enough to encourage conservation, efficiencies, alternative
supplies, and new technologies. And the most vulnerable
countries and people are victimized by the whole confusion
- as they are hit by high prices, price volatility, and climate
change.
Most oil production is now controlled by national oil companies.
These suppliers do not respond to market signals in the same
way as private producers.
We need a "global bargain" among major producers and consumers
of energy. The International Energy Agency organized
OECD consumers, but does not include all the rising powers.
A few years ago, China suggested that the major energy consumers
organize to deal more effectively with the producers' cartel.
This is an idea worth considering, though with a broader purpose.
At a minimum, such a bargain should involve sharing plans
for expanding supplies, including options other than oil and
gas; improving efficiency and lessening demand; assisting
with energy for the poor; and considering how these policies
relate to carbon production and climate change policies.
Developed countries need to create and bring new technologies
to market, to help both developed and developing countries.
Developing countries need to reduce costly subsidies and increase
efficiencies, while coping with social instabilities.
And everyone should have an interest in preventing energy
resources from triggering national security threats.
Part of the bargain will be to provide an opportunity for
developing countries to make longer-term investments to reduce
vulnerability to high and volatile fuel prices while supporting
the poor with safety nets. Energy access needs to be
a critical complement to clean energy investments. Over
one and a half billion people in the world do not have access
to electricity, including about three quarters of the population
of sub-Saharan Africa. At the request of key shareholders,
the World Bank Group is developing an Energy for the Poor
initiative to help the poorest countries meet energy needs
in efficient and sustainable ways.
We might consider taking the global bargain further.
There could be a common interest in managing a price range
that reconciles interests while transitioning toward lower
carbon growth strategies, a broader portfolio of supplies,
and greater international security.
Multilateral understandings about energy futures - leading
to clear pricing for carbon - might also be vital for the
UNFCCC negotiations on climate change. Countries are
fearful that in a world of uncertain energy costs, technologies,
and supplies, a climate change treaty will limit their growth
or flexibility to adapt. A bargain among key producers
and consumers might counter these risks, making it easier
to commit to cut carbon.
A climate change accord also will have to be supported by
new tools. We need new mechanisms to support forestation
and avoid deforestation, develop new technologies and encourage
their rapid diffusion, provide financial support to poorer
countries, assist with adaptation, and strengthen carbon markets.
Two weeks ago, to help provide additional resources for these
challenges, the Bank hosted a pledging session that raised
USD 6.1 billion for new Climate Investment Funds.
The Steering Group should help push action on energy, the
environment, and financing to assist the UN negotiations and
the practical implementation of a treaty.
Fragile States: Securing Development
Nowhere is the New Multilateral Network needed more than
in the fragile and post-conflict states where the "Bottom
Billion" live.
Too often, the development community has treated states blighted
by fragility and conflict simply as harder cases of development.
Yet these situations require looking beyond the analytics
of development to a different framework of building security,
legitimacy, governance, and the economy. This is not
security or development as usual. Nor is it about what
we have come to think of as peace-building or peacekeeping.
Securing Development is about bringing security and development
together first to smooth the transition from conflict to peace
and then to embed stability so that development can take hold
over a decade and beyond. Only by securing development
can we put down roots deep enough to break the cycle of fragility
and violence.
Our appreciation of how best to secure development - to synthesize
security, governance, and economics to be most effective -
is still modest. We face critical gaps in international
capabilities.
Ultimately, the most important element in fragile or post-conflict
states is the people of those countries. But it will
take much stronger and longer-lasting multilateral assistance
to help these people shift from being victims to becoming
the principal agents of recovery. Beyond assistance,
it requires new networked relationships between peacekeeping
forces and development practitioners, and a new approach to
security.
VI. Conclusion
Next month, the United States will elect a new President.
That President will need to move beyond the firefight of financial
stabilization. Dealing with the economic aftermath will
be one of the foremost responsibilities of the next Administration.
That work is not about America alone. Both candidates
have spoken about strengthening the sinews of America's ties
with the world. How the next American President will
do this matters.
Fate presents an opportunity wrapped in a necessity:
To Modernize Multilateralism and Markets.
President
The World Bank Group
The Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington,
DC
October 6, 2008
Dossier
Loose ends
Two years later, subsequent to the bank interventions that affected 14 private institutions, Public Prosecutor Office maintains investigations open, these concern the public funds that ended up at some of those organisms and were utilized in shady financial operations, this is included among the accusations held by the Public Ministry against some bankers.
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